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[67 C.2d

[Crim. No. 10533. In Bank. July 20, 1967.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JIMMIE LEE
ROSS, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Searches-Without Warrant-Incidental to Arrest.-A search
of a person incidental to a lawful arrest is valid.

[2] Arrest-Without Warrant-Reasonable Cause-DeAnition.Reasonable cause for arrest is defined as that state of facts as
would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and
conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that
the person is guilty of a crime.
[8] Id..-WithoutWarrant-B.easonable Oause-Determination.There is no exact formula for the determination of reasonable
cause for an arrest; each case must be decided on the facts
and circumstances presented to the officers at th~ time they
were required to act.
[4] Id..-Without Warrant-Reasonable Oause-Information From
OJEcial 8ources.-In making an arrest without a warrant,
police officers are entitled to rely on information from official
sources, including radio broadcasts from other police units.
l5] Id~-Without Warrant-Reasonable Cause-Facts Bstablishing: Searches Without Warrant-Incidental to Arrest.Probable cause existed for the arrest of a suspect by the
police and the incidental search of his person was valid, where
the arresting officers had been informed by radio of a robbery,
of the description of defendant's ear, which they earlier
pursued, of the defendant himself, and of the place where the
pursuit ended, in the vicinity of which, shortly afterwards,
they found defendant, who matched precisely the description
that had been" given to them.
"
[8a,6b] Searchea-Without Warrant-Incidental to Arrest: Seiz1lI'8 of Evidentia.l"J' Matter.-The seizure by police of a robbery suspect's money and effects, found on his person when he
was booked, was lawful, and it was immaterial that the court
[2] See Cal.J'ur.2d, Arrest, § 10; Am.J'ur.2d, Arrest, § 44McK. Dig. References: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 24; [2]
Arrest, § 12(4); [3] Arrest, § 12(7); [4] Arrest, § 12(9); [5]
Arrest, § 12(13) ; Searches and Seizures, § 24; [6, 7] Searches and
Seizures, §§ 24, 35, 36; [8] Robbery, § 23; Criminal Law, t1080
(6); "[9, 10] Criminal Law, § 264(4); [11] Criminal Law. § 565
(4); [12] Criminal Law, §§ 628(1), 852.2; [18] Criminal Law,
'1840; [14,16] Criminal Law, § 1404(17).

1
I

fuly1967]

PEOPLE

v. Ross

[8'1 C.2d 64; 60 Cal.Rptr. 254, 429 P.2d 606]

65

later ordered some of the money returned to him as being
surplus to the amount stolen and unconnected with the issues
of the case.
[?] Id.-Without Warrant-Incidental to Arrest: Seizure of Evidentiary Matter.-The search of an arrested person at the
time of his "booking" is reasonable, as being contemporaneous
with his arrest; his personal effects may be removed from him,
and the police may examine them to see if they have been
stolen, return them to the prisoner on his release, or preserve
them for use as evidence at the time of trial.
[8] Robbery-Evidence-Admissibility-Demonstrative Evidence:
Criminal Law-Appeal-Necessity for Objection.-In a robbery trial, the accused's money and personal effects which
were of evidentiary value were properly received in evidence,
where they had been validly seized on his arrest, and especially where two employees of the robbed company had seen
him take money from the company desk and place it in his
pockets (even though the money removed from him was not
actually identified as the coins or currency actually stolen). In
any event, such alleged error, to which no objection was made
at the trial, could not be raised for the first time on appeal.
[9a,9b] Criminal Law-Trial-Custody a.nd Restraint of Accused.
-An accused was not prejudiced at his trial by the sheriff's
reasonable security precaution of bringing him into the courtroom handcuffed, where the jury knew, from the charges
against him of robbery and attempted murder, that he was in
custody, where he had previously been convicted of robbery,
and where the handcuffs were removed prior to the initiation
of any judicial proceedings.
[10] Id.-Trial-Custody and Restraint of Accused.-Unless there
is danger of escape, an. accused is generally entitled to appear,
during the progress of his trial, free of shackles, but when
reasonable precautions are taken to retain custody of him the
fact that they bring before the jury information that a
defendant is a convict and perhaps a dangerous character does
not deprive him of a fair trial.
[l1] Id.-Evidence-Weight-Identity - Matter for Jury.-The
weight to be given to the circumstances of an accused's identification from a picture of a police lineup was a matter for the
jury; the fact that the picture showed the accused in coveralls
and the others in street clothes did not constitute prejudicial
error, and might even have been advantageous to the accused
as affording him an opportunity to impeach the veracity of the
identification.
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[12] Id.-Argument of Counsel-Defendant's Refusal to Testify:
Instructions.-The Griffin rule, holding that comment by court
or counsel on an accused's failure to testify (Const., art. I,
§ 13) violates the privilege against self-incrimination under
U.S. Const., 5th and 14th Amends., is applicable to cases pend- - ---ing on direct appeal at the time the Griffin decision was
announced.
[13] Id.-Appeal-Federal Constitutional Error-Burden of Proving Harmless.-In a criminal appeal, the prosecution bears the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a federal
constitutional error proved harmless, namely, that there was
no reasonable possibility for its having affected the outcome of
the trial. Once that burden has been discharged, the error no
longer serves as a basis for reversal.
[14a, 14b] Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Comment on FaUure of
Defendant to Testify.-In an attempted murder trial, error of
court· and counsel. in commenting on defendant's failure to
testify was not reversible, where the defense in no way suggested someone other than defendant might have perpetrated
the crime, and where, as the case was presented to the jury,
only two conclusions were possible, one of which was inher~ntly incredible, and the other, that defendant was the perpetrator.
[16] Id.-Appeal-l'rejudicial Error........Comment on Defendant's
Failure to Testify.-Iu the context of inferenc.es from a
defendant's failure to testify, a prohibited comment which
eould not serve to fill an evidentiary gap in the prosecution'15
case must, to prove prejudicial, at least touch a live nerve in
the defense, not one which has been rendered inert· by such
intrinsic improbability as would prevent it from generating
any real doubt in the mind of a reasoning juror.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Bernardino' County. John P. Knauf, Judge. Affirmed.

Prosecution for first degree robbery and attempted murder.
Judgment of conviction affirmed.
Jimmie Lee Ross, in pro. per., and Bertram H. Ross, under
appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, and Walter R. Jones, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
[14] See Oal.Jur.2d. Trial, § 436.
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McCOMB, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of
conviction of (a) robbery in the first degree and (b)
attempted murder.
Pacts: Walter Williams, general manager of a San Bernardino ice cream company, was in his office about 10 p.m. on
September 20, 1964, counting daily receipts. A company
driver, Mr. Asa Brown, was present. A person later identified
as defendant appeared at the door and declared, "This is a
stickup, Walt." Mr. Williams, known by that nickname, had
never seen the person before. The intruder wore black shoes,
dark trousers, a zippered jacket, gloves, and a woman's nylon
stocking over his head. He was carrying a single-barreled
shotgun with tape around it. The gun was pointed at the head
'and chest of Mr. Brown seated at the office desk.
The intruder ordered the two employees to get down on the
:floor and face the wall. They complied with the order,
although Williams continued to face in the direction of the
intruder and was thus able to observe the thief take an
unknown amount of currency from the desk and place it in
his pocket. The thief then said, "Let's go to the safe room."
The employees were ordered to open the safe and to again get
down on the floor.
The n~on lights in the room were defective and occasionally
1Uckerea, prompting the thief to say, "What is that' Who
turned that light on' You know, if anybody walks through
that back door now, he is a dead man." The thief reached
into the safe for a large sack of money, and finding it too
heavy to lift with one hand he placed the shotgun on the floor
to use both of his hands. Williams yelled, "Let's get him,"
and the employees rushed the intruder. The thief was able to
regain possession of the gun and used it as a club, striking
Williams repeatedly on the head, arms and body. During the
scuftle with their assailant, both employees were able to closely
observe his features despite the stocking. They later positively
identified defendant as the robber.
Mr. Brown broke away to call the police, while Williams
continued the struggle, but the thief was able to escape with a
sack containing rolled money and currency. Williams later
estimated the entire amount taken was approximately $800.
As the thief fled he warned "Don't come any closer or I
will shoot." Nevertheless, Williams and Brown followed him
outside and saw him retreating with the shotgun and a traveling bag. The thief pointed the gun at them and ordered,
"Don't try to follow; get back." After the robber disap-
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peared from view, Williams advanced to the corner of the
building and observed a person he believed to be the thief
behind an automobile approximately 100 feet away. He next
heard a blast from a shotgun and felt pellets strike both legs.
Police officers arrived shortly thereafter, and during their
investigation they found coins lying on the street where the
shot was fired. Bystanders provided a description of the
suspect's automobile, and Brown described the physical
characteristics of the thief. This information was transmitted
by radio to a police dispatcher, who alerted all units.
About 10 :40 p.m. a vehicle answering the radio description
was sighted by a San Bernardino police patrol unit. Theofficers immediately attempted to halt the vehicle with a red
light and siren. Instead of stopping, the driver accelerated
and attempted to evade pursuit. Realizing the fleeing automobile was not going to stop, the officers fired seven shots during
the ensuing pursuit, to which the suspect responded with a
shotgun blast. During the pursuit the officers were able to
observe that the driver of the vehicle wore a white shirt and
red vest.
During the chase the officers were in radio contact with
other police units, and when the pursuit reached the jurisdictional border of the neighboring community of Colton, an
alerted police unit was waiting to interc~pt. The latter took
over with red light, siren and spotlight~ The driver of the
suspect vehicle leaned out of the car window and swung a
taped, sawed-off shotgun towards the pursuing Colton police
approximately two c·ar lengths behind. The officer beamed his
spotlight directly into the suspect's face and slid down on the
front seat. He saw a flash and heard the report of the shotgun. Pellets struck the police vehicle, breaking a headlight,
puncturing the radiator, and richocheting off the windshield.
Pursuit, however, continued until the escape route became
blocked by gates to a mill yard entrance. The suspect
increased his speed and broke through, but further progress
was prevented by a variety of materials stacked in the yard.
As the suspect jumped from his vehicle, the officer trained a
spotlight directly on the fugitive, who looked back toward the
light, enabling the officer to observe at close range his face
and profile. The officer later positively identified defendant as
tht> person pursued.
The suspect began to run despite an order to haIt. The
officer returned to the police unit and radioed a report in
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which he described the suspect as blond, wearing a white
shirt, tie, dark trousers and a bright red vest.
A San Bernardino police vehicle, who had been monitoring
the chase by radio and heard the description, observed a man
in a white shirt, black pants and a red sweater vest walking
across an open field. He was carrying a necktie in his hand,
his clothes were disheveled, and he appeared to be tired.
Defendant was arrested and transported to the San Bernardino city jail. An examination was made of the suspect
vehicle, identified as belonging to defendant. Officers discovered therein $131 in currency, $298 in rolled coin, $154.23 in
loose coin, five money bags, shotgun shells, numerous articles
of clothing, a traveling bag, and a pair of gloves. The money
bags contained daily receipts and stamped coin wrappers
identified as belonging to the plundered ice cream company.
Also recovered was a check bearing the endorsement of Asa
Brown whic:\l he had cashed and placed in the company safe
prior to tbe robbery. Approximately 100 feet from defendant's abandoned vehicle, officers found a sawed-off shotgun
with white tape on the barrel.
The day following the robbery Brown was reque~ted to view
a police showup, and he identified defendant as th~ thief from
a line~ of four persons.
Questions: First. Was the incidental search of defendant's
person proper'
Yes. [1] It is axiomatic that a search of the person incidental to a lawful arrest is valid. (United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60, 64 [94 L.Ed. 653, 657, 659, 70 S.Ct.
430] ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 [70 L.Ed. 145,
148, 46 S.Ct. 4, 51 A.L.R. 409] ; People v. Simon, 45 Cal.2d
645, 648 [2a] [290 P.2d 531] ; In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 761762 [9] [264 P.2d 513].)
A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant
whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed a felony. (Pen. Code, § 836, subd.
(3).) [2] "Reasonable cause" is defined as that state of
facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to
believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime. (People v.
Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 412 [2] [2 Cal. Rptr. 14, 348 P.2d 577] ;
People v. Fischer, 49 Ca1.2d 442, 446 [1] [317 P.2d 967].)
[3] No exact formula exists for determining reasonable
cause, and each case must be decided on the facts and circum-
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stances presented to the officers at the time they were required
to act. (People v. Ingle, supra, at p. 412 [1] ; People v. Fergu".·
son, 214 Cal.App.2d 772, 775 [4] [29 Cal.Rptr. 691].)
[4, 5] The arresting officers, through official radio communicatio~, were fully apprized of the commission of an armed
robbery; they had a description of the car, which they had
pursuedllntil the Colton police took command; they also had
a detailed description of the driver from the Colton police and
they knew that the pursuit had terminated at the mill yard.
They were entitled to rely on information from official
sources. (People v. Estrada, 234 Cal.App.2d 136, 152 [11] [44
Cal.Rptr. 165, 11 A.L.R.3d 1307]; People v. Schellin, 227
Cal.App.2d 245, 251 [7] [38 CatRptr. 593].) Shortly thereafter, while patrolling in the vicinity of the mill yard, the
officers observed defendant walking through an open field; his
descl'iption matcheu precisely that given by the officer who
had him in the spotlight; his clothes were disheveled, anq _h~
appeared tired. The arresting officers clearly had probable
cause to arrest defendant, and the incidental search of his
person was, therefore, valid. (Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175-176 [93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890-1891, 69 S.Ct. 1302] ;
P~ople v. Schader, 62 Ca1.2d 716, 722 [2a], 725 [2b] [44 Cal.
Rptr. 193, 401 P.2d 665].)
[6a] Second. Was the seizure of defendant's personal
effects, including money found on h·is person, lawful'
Yes. [7] A search of an arrested person at the time of
his booking has always been considered contemporaneous to
his arrest and is a reasonable search. His personal effects may
be removed from him; the police may examine them to see if
they have been stolen, return them to the prisoner on his
release, or preserve them for use as evidence at the time of
trial. (People v. Rogers, 241 Cal.App.2d 384, 389 [7-8] [50
Cal.Rptr. 559] ; People v. lVicklif/, 144 Cal.App.2d 207, 213
[6] [300 P.2d 749] ; Bruce v. Sibeck, 25 Gal.App.2d 691, 697698 [3] [78 P.2d 741].)
Section 1412 of the Penal Code provides that when" money
or other property" is taken from an arrested' defendant the
officer taking it must give a receipt therefor. This statutory
requirement necessarily assumes that "money or other
property" may be lawfully seized from one arrested for a
crime. (44 CaI.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 23, pp. 305306.) [6b] The fact that the court ordered a portion of the
money found on defendant's person at the time of his arrest
returned prior to trial does not derogate the fact of its lawful
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seizure. The money was surplus to the amount reported stolen
from the ice cream company, and the overage was not
involved with issues in the present case.
[8] Third. Were defendant's clothes and money properly
admitted in evidence T
Yes. The personal effects taken from defendant which were
of evidentiary value were properly received in evidence. (People v. Davis, 205 Cal.App.2d 517, 521 [7] [23 Cal.Rptr. 152].)
Where a defendant is charged with robbery, evidence relating
to money found on his person when arrested is relevant and
admissible, particularly where, as here, the employees testified
that they saw defendant take money from the company dC's1\:
and place it in his pocket.
The fact that the money was not identified as the coins or
currency taken in the robbery did not require its exclusion. In
People v. Harsch, 44 Cal.App.2d 572 [112 P.2d 654],. the
defendant made a similar objection to the admission of money
and coins found in his car and on his person at the time of his
arrest. The court at page 576 stated: "While it is true that
the coins were not capable of identification, and appellant
said he obtained them in a crap game, nevertheless, it was
definitely established by the testimony of the two men, who
were held up, that the money taken from the cash register
co~isted mainly of small change, consequently, the coins
found in appellant's car at the time of the arrest were
'admissible in evidence, not as being sufficient in themselves to
warrant or sustain his conviction, but as a circumstance which
it was proper to place before the jury for their consideration
in passing upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant [cita- .
tion].' " (See also People v. Hickok, 198 Cal.App.2d 442, 444445 [lb] [17 Cal.Rptr. 875].)
Furthermore, it should be noted that defendant made no
objection at the trial to the introduction of his personal effects
into evidence1 on the ground of unlawful search and seizure,
and he cannot raise the matter for the firE!t time on appeal.
(People v. Talbot, 64 Ca1.2d 691, 709 [11] [51 Cal.Rptr. 417,
414 P.2d 633] ; People v. Cockrell, 63 Ca1.2d 659, 667 [9] [47
Cal.Rptr. 788,408 P.2d 116].)
[9a] Fourth. Was defendant prejudiced by his appearance in handcuffs!
ITbe record sbows that before defendant's personal effects (clothes,
gloves, tie, wallet, identification, etc.) were admitted in evidence, defendant's counsel and tbe prosecutor stipulated tbat certain identification
papers disclosing defendant's parole number be excluded. There was no
objection to the other items.
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No. In the presence of the jury, defendant was brought into
the courtroom handcuffed, and the restraints were removed
prior to the initiation of any judicial proceedings. In chambers, defendant moved for a mistrial, which was denied.
[10] In general, unless there is danger of escape, an
accused is entitled to appear during the progress of his trial
free of shackles. (People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165 [10 Am.
Rep. 296].) However, "When reasonable precautions are
taken to retain custody of an accused the fact that they bring
before the jury information that a defendant is a convict and
perhaps a dangerous character does not deprive him of a fair
trial" (People v. Burwell, 44 Cal2d 16, 32 [14] [279 P.2d
744].)
[9b] In the present case, defendant was facing a life sentence and had been previously convicted of robbery. It was a
reasonable practice for the sheriff to keep prisoners handcuffed while in transit, and the fact that the handcuffs were
removed inside the courtroom rather' than outside added to
the security. (See People v. Hillery, 65 Ca1.2d 795, 805-806
[5] [~6 Cal.Rptr. 280, 423 P.2d 208].) There was no harmful
effect: of such practice, since the jury knew defendant was in
custody.
Unlike People v. Harrington, supra, 42 Cal. 165, and People
v. Thompson, 23 CalApp.2d 339 [72 P.2d 927], where the
defendants were chained and shackled during the progress of
their trials, here the handcuffs were removed after the sheriff
brought defendant into the courtroom. Moreover, in the
Thompson case, the error was held not prejudicial because the
defendant's guilt was so clear and convincing that no miscarriage of justice resulted.
[11] Fifth. lVas it prejudicial error to admit a picture of
a police lineup in which defenda,nt was clothed in coveralls
and the others in street clothes 1
No. In People v. Branch, 127 Cal.App.2d 438, 440 [1] [274
P.2d 31], identification by means of a standard police lineup
was discussed. It was held that a police "showup" is not
based on any legal requirement but is designed to assist the
jury in weighing evidence relative to identification. In the
present case, the introduction of the picture may have been
advantageous to defendant, rather than prejudicial, since it
afforded him an opportunity to impeach the veracity of the
lineup identification. The circumstances of the identification
was a matter to be considered by the jury in determining the
weight it should be given. (People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.2d 175,
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179 [1] [217 P.2d 1] ; People v. Shaw, 237 Cal.App.2d 606,
622 [12] [47 Cal.Rptr. 96].)
Sixth. Did the prosecutor's comments and the court's
instruction on defendant's failure to testify constitute harmless error T
Yes. [12] At the time of defendant's trial, the California Constitution permitted comment by the court and
counsel on an accused's failure to testify (art. I, § 13).
Thereafter, on April 28, 1965, the United States Supreme
Court in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106,
85 8.Ct. 1229], held that adverse comment violated the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth A1l1endment.
The Griffin rule is applicable to cases pending on direct
apP'eal at the time it was announced. (See Tehan v. Shott, 382
U.S. 406, 409, fn. 3 [15 L.Ed.2d 453, 86 8.Ct. 459] ; People v.
Perez, 65 Cal.2d 615, 620 [4], fn. 2 [55 Cal.Rptr. 909, 422
P.2d 597] ; People v. lng, 65 Cal.2d 603, 609 [1], fn. 2 [55
Cal.Rptr. 902,422 P.2d 590].)
In Ohapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87
S.ctt. 824], the Supreme Court held that constitutional errors
do not require automatic reversal of convictions without
regard to the facts and circumstances of each case, but that
"before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." (386 U.S. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d
at pp. 710-711].)
.We have recently recognized that the Chapman rule does
not permit us to affirm a conviction" simply because we deem
it improbable that a result more favorable to the defendant
would have been reached in the absence of the Griffin error."
(People v. Modesto (1967) 66 Cal.2d 695, 712 [59 Cal.
Rptr. 124, 427 P.2d 788].) The Supreme Court required in
Ohapman that we focus on "reasonable possibility" rather
than "probability" (386 U.S. at p 23 [17 L.Ed.2d at p.
710]) and that we cast "on someone other than the person
prejudiced by [a federal constitutional error] a burden to
show that it was harmless." (ld. at p. 24 [17 J,J.Ed.2d at p.
710].) The court did not, however, require that we ignore the
possible impact of the error upon the outcome of the case.
In this connection, the meaning of the court's reference to
errors which " 'might have contributed to the conviction' "
(w. at p. 23 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710]) becomes clear in the
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context of the entire opinion, since the court expressly stated
that it sought "a rule that will save the good in harmlesserror practices while avoiding the bad." (Ibid.) The court
explained the "good" which it wished to preserve by its
formulation: Harmlcss error rules, the court said, "serve a
very useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have Uttle, if any, likeli.
hood of having changed the result of the trial." (ld. at p. 22
[17 L.Ed.2d at p. 709] ; italics added.)
[13] In essence, then, the court avoided any statement of
intention to compel the reversal of convictions on the basis of
errors which are "harmless' 'in the sense that there is no
reasonable possibility of their having affected the outcome of
the trial. The prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that a federal constitutional error proved
harmless in this sense; once that burden has been discharged,
the error "no longer serves as a basis for reversal." (People
v. Modesto, supra, 66 Ca1.2d at p. 712.)
[14a] Thus, in applying its rule to the circumstances of
the case before it, the court in Chapman stressed the fact that
" absent the constitutionally forbidden comments, honest, fair.
minded jurors might very well have brought in not-gUilty
verdicts." (386 U.S. at pp. 25-26 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 711].) On
, the compelling record which we have summarized above, we
can conceive of no reasonable possibility that this jury could
have reached any verdict other than one of guilt even if the
prohibited comments2 had never been uttered.
2The trial court gave the standard instruction permitting the jury to
draw an inference adverse to defendant from his failure to e%plain or
deny facts within his knowledge.
In his closing argument the deputy district attorney said: " ••• The
witness cannot be compelled to testify. He has a eonstitutional right to--remain silen t.
"We have the burden of proof and we have to prove the charges
involved in this case. Remember, where a defendant fails to testify and
there are facts within his own knowledge, facts within his own knowledge
which he cannot explain or deny such as the facts in this case, he can very
well say, 'I didn't go into this place. You have got the wrong man.'
, 'In fact that is probably the argument you will hear, but he hasn't
even denied or explained any aggregated circumstances.
, , So you may take his failure to e%plain all that as indicating they are
true. And the inference that he may draw from our evidence is that the
evidence is probably true and as adduced in this ease."
With reference to defendant's crashing through a gate when his escape
route was blocked, the prosecutor said: "What do you think of a person
who would deliberately ram through a fence that way' You can see that
he ran right through the fence. Deliberately slowed down and ran right
through it. What kind of a person are we dealing with in this case' He
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Defendant's attorney in no way suggested here, either
through the testimony of witnesses or in argument to the
jury, that someone other than the defendant might have
perpetrated this crime and that the defendant might simply
have driven the getaway car from the scene of the robbery or
that he might have replaced the robber in the car at some
later time. Thus, as the case was presented to this jury, only
two conclusions were possible: Either the defendant's possession of a vehicle matching the getaway car and containing the
proceeds of the robbery was purely fortuitous, or the defendant must have been the robber. Given the fact that the
defendant fled from the police and fired at them with a sawedoff shotgun similar to that used in the course of the robbery,
the first of these two possibilities evaporated into the inherently incredible, leaving no real gap in the prosecution's case.
[15] Under these circumstances, our remarks in People v.
Modesto, supra, 66 Ca1.2d at p. 714, bear repetition here :
"In order to prove prejudicial, a comment which could not
serve to fill an evidentiary gap in the prosecution's case must
at least touch a live nerve in the defense, not one which has
~en rendered inert by such intrinsic improbability as would
prevent it from generating any real doubt in the mind of a
reasoning juror. Thus the posture of the defense in the
instant case minimized to the point of insignificance the possible impact of the comment." [14b] We need not speculate
here whether the comment might have assumed significance if
the defense had planted the suggestion that the defendant had
an accomplice who actually committed the robbery and did
the shooting; our function under Chapman is not to assess the
prejudicial impact of an error in a trial which did not occur
but to evaluate that impact as the case in fact unfolded at this
trial. Placing the burden of proof upon the prosecution, we
have concluded that the challenged comments proved entirely
inconsequential in the case before us. Accordingly, Chapman
does not require the state to conduct a new trial.
The judgment is affirmed.
Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.
hasn't even come up here to deny any of this. We have all those photographs. You can look at them."
Near the end of his argument the prosecutor said: "Folks, I think
that I usually talk about an hour, but in this ease the evidence is so overwhelming, yet the evidence is so aggravating, so terrifying, and he, as I
have been saying, he hasn't wanted even to get up here and say, I I
didn't do it.' He is not guilty, but he could say that much. "

...
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-I dissent.
The record establishes that the instruction and comment on
defendant's failure to testify were prejudicial under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct.
824].
A jury found defendant guilty of the robbery of an .ice
cream company and the attempted murder of the manager,
Walter Williams. The robber, who was masked, carried a
sawed-off shotgun and threatened to use it during the course
of the robbery. He warned Williams and Brown, the assistant
manager, not to follow him out of the plant. Williams did so,
however, and was shot in the leg by pellets from a shotgun.
Although Williams could not see his assailant, who was
hidden behind an automobile a hundred feet away, he believed
that the fleeing robber fired the shot.
Brown gave police officers a description of the robber, and
bystanders gave them a description of the suspect's automobile. Approximately 40 minutes after the robbery, a police
unit saw a car answering the description given by the
bystanders. The driver was wearing a distinctive red vest,
white shirt, and dark tie. The officers pursued, the car, and.
during the chase the driver fired a shotgun at them. They
followed .the car until it was driven to a dead end and aban! doned. They arrested defendant not far from the abandoned
: ear. He was wearing a red vest and white shirt and had a
dark tie in his hand. The officers identified him as the driver
of the car. They found a sawed-off shotgun and the proceeds
of the robbery in the car, which was. regist.ered in defendant's
name.
Although defendant was linked to the car and the car was
linked to the robbery, the only direct link to the commission
of the robbery and the attempted murder was the doubtful
identification of defendant by Williams and Brown.
Williams identified defendant as the robber at the trial, but
the identification could have been disbelieved or deemed
unreliable by the jury. He admitted under cross-examination ____
that he could not remember any distinctive feature of the
robber or his clothing. The robber was masked, and Williams
did not supply the officers with any usable description of
him.
Brown's identification of defendant as the robber could
also have been disbelieved or deemed unreliable by the jury.
He described the robber as wearing tan pants and having
dark hair. Defendant hus blond hair and was wearing dark .o;
II
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pants when he was arrested. Brown admittedly had less
opportunity than Williams had to see the robber during the
course of the robbery. Brown did not mention the distinctive
red vest, white shirt, and dark tie, described by the officers
and used by them as a basis for identifying defendant as the
driver of the car. Moreover, his description of the robber did
not aid the officers in their pursuit.
Brown identified defendant in a police showup, but this
identification could also have been disbelieved or deemed
unreliable by the jury. Defendant was dressed differently
from the others at the showup; he wore coveralls, but the
other participants wore street clothing. (Cf. United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926] ; Gilbert
v. Oalifornia, 388 U.S. 263 [18 L.Ed.2d 1178], 87 S.Ct. 1951] ;
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 87 S.Ct.
1967] .)
Defendant's identification by Williams and Brown was
subject to doubt on another ground. Defendant was a stranger
to the ice cream company's plant, and neither Williams nor
Brown had ever seen him, before. The robber, however, was
familiar with the plant. He called \Villiams ' , Walt, " a name
used only by Williams' associates; he knew that the area
where the company safe was kept was called the ' 'safe
room"; and he knew the location of the "safe room." This
evidence that the robber was an insider or had a co-conspirator who was an insider casts considerable doubt on defendant's being the robber. There may have been two men
involved, one who committed the robbery and attempted
murder and another who either waited in the car or joined the
robber later. If the robber left the car in the possession of
another man during the 40-minute period before it was seen
by the police unit, that circumstance would explain the inaccurate descriptions of the clothing and hair color of the
robber as compared with the person ultimately arrested.
At the outset of his argument the prosecutor stated that the
weak point in his case was the lack of clear identification of
defendant as the robber. 1 He admitted the difficulty of inferring that because defendant was linked to the car and the car
was linked to the robbery, defendant committed the robbery
and attempted the murder of Williams. To bolster his case,
1" In this case I am not going to discuss the elements. The crime was
committed. The fact is undisputed that there was a robbery and there
was an attempted murder. There is no question about that at all. The
only failure is-we haven't proved that the defendant was responsible."

)
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the prosecutor relied heavily on de~endant 's .failure to take
the stand and deny that he was the robber and attempted
murderer. He told the jury that defendant's failure to deny
or explain the facts in the case allowed them to consider as
true the inferences most favorable to the prosecution. Each
time the prosecutor's argument faltered he relied heavily on
comment on defendant's silence, and the court's instruction
expressly sanctioned the drawing of adverse inferences therefrom by the jury.2
Although the prosecutor might have proceeded on the
theory that defendant was either the actual robber or an
accessory who drove the getaway car, he chose to try the case
solely on the more difficult theory that defendant personally
committed the robbery and the attempted murder. Moreover,
he admitted that the state's case left room for doubt as to
defendant's guilt. Since defendant presented no evidence, his
defense was necessarily based on the weakness of the eyewitness identification and the gaps in the circumstantial evidence
linking him to the actual commission of the robbery. His
2" Remember, where a defendant fails to testify and there are facts
within his own knowledge, facts within his own knowledge which he cannot
expla~ or deny such as the facts in this case, he can very well say, 'I
didn't go into this place. You llave got the wrong man.' In fact that is
probably the argument you will hear, but he hasn't even denied or explained any aggregated circumstances. So you may take his failure to
explain all that as indicating they are true.••.
"What kind of person are we dealing with in this case' He hasn't
come up here to deny any of tbis. . • .
"Folks, I think that I usually talk about an hour, but in this case the
evidence is so overwhelming, yet the evid~nce is so aggravating, 80
terrifying, and he, as I have been saying, he hasn't wanted even to get
up here and say, 'I didn't do it.' He is not guilty, but he could say that
much. . . .
, , We connect tIle robbery tllrougll tlle identification of the property of
yours. How did I get it' He didn't even take the witness stand. And
he explained tbis was his car. He wasn't driving it. And to explain how
tbis money got in there, and what would you say if you found money like
that in my car just soon after the robbery' What would you think I was
up to' Going out for a picnic or something like that! This is proof of .
a robbery, in the position of a robber and murderer very soon after the
offense. . . •
"And the comment which Mr. Arias [defendant's counsel] made was
heyond the evidence. There is no question that Mr. Ross didn't walk into
that place. There is no evidence by him saying that he did not walk
into this place. He didn't offer any testimony at all."
The court instructed the jury concerning the defendant's failure to
testify as follows: "As to allY evidence or facts against him which the
defendant can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts
within bis knowledge, if he does not testify or if, though he does testify,
he fails to deny or explain such evidence, the jury may take that failure
into consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and 88",
indicating that among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom. those unfavorable to the defendant are the more proba.ble."

j
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counsel pointed out to the jury that defendant was charged
with actually committing the robbery and attempted murder,
and he urged that the evidence established a reasonable doubt.
He thus relied on the fixed procedural requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is for the jury to determine whether the balance of
probabilities excludes a reasonable doubt. Unless that balance
appears from the evidence so overwhelming that no reasonable
juror could entertain a reasonable doubt, argument and
instruction" that among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from [the evidence] those unfavorable to the
defendant are the more probable,' '3 necessarily vitiate the
defense of reasonable doubt. Under such instruction and
argument doubts need not be resolved in favor of the defendant but may be resolved in favor of the prosecution, thereby
enhancing the probabilities of a guilty verdict. By diminishing the fixed procedural requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the error deprived defendant of a substantial right and denied him a fair trial. (Bollenbach v. United
States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 [90 L.Ed. 350, 355, 66 S.Ct. 402] ;
Bihn v. UnitedJ States, 328 U.S. 633, 637 [90 L.Ed. 1484, 14871488, 66 8.Ct. 1172] ; see also Boatright v. United States, 105
F.2d 737, 740.) Moreover, since it served to stifle the doubts
that might reasonably have been engendered by the inconsistencies in the prosecution's cirumstantial case, it may even
have carried decisive weight with the jury. Accordingly, the
Attorney General has not established beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error did not contribute to the result. (Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 26 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710711, 87 8.Ct. 824].)
The majority opinion states that" on the compelling record
which we have summarized . . . we can conceive of no reasonable possibility that this jury could have reached any verdict other than one of guilt even if the prohibited comments
had never been uttered." Even if this factual assumption
were correct, it is one that should never be allowed to undermine our commitment to procedural fairness. "Are we then to
disregard errors no matter how substantial, if upon a review
of the evidence we are satisfied with the verdict of the jury T
Such a course will simply Plean in the long run the abolishing
of all forms of law taught by experience to be necessary to the
protection of the innocent." (People v. Marendi, 213 N.Y.
8This statement is from the trial judge's eharge. See footnote 2, supra.
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600, 619 [107 N.E. 1058, 1064]; People v. Nuzzo, 294 N.Y.
227,235-236 [62 N.E.2d 47, 51].) Verdicts that may be based
on constitutional error must not be allowed to stand. (Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665 [8 L.Ed.2d 758, 762, 82
S.Ct. 1417] ; Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292
[87 L.Ed. 279,282,63 S.Ct. 207, 143 A.L.R 1273] ; Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 [75 L.Ed. 1117, 1122, 51 S.Ot.
532,73 A.L.R. 1484].)
In our own cases we have stated that" [t]he fact that a
record shows a defendant to be guilty of a crime does not
necessarily determine that there has not been a miscarriage of
justice." (People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 627 [258 P. 607]
[disparaging comments by judge] ; see also People v. Conley,
64 Ca1.2d 310, 319-320 [49 Cal.Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911] [right
to jury trial on every significant issue] ; People v. McKay, 37
Ca1.2d 192, 798-800 [236 P.2d 145] [unfair pretrial publicity]; People v. Sarazzawski, 27 Ca1.2d 7, 10-11 [161 P.2d
934] [various errors causing denial of a fair trial] ; People v.
Patubo, 9 Cal.2d 537, 542-543 [71 P.2d 270, 113 P.2d 1303]
[disparaging comments by judge] ; People v. Muza, 178 Cal.
App.2d 901, 913-914 [3 Cal.Rptr. 395], cert.den. 369 U.S. 839
[7 L.Ed.2d 843, 82 S.Ct. 869] [remarks of trial judge] ; People v. Duvernay, 43 Cal.App.2d 823, 828-831, 111 P.2d 659]
[misconduct of prosecution].) Similarly in People v. Spencer,
66 Cal.2d 158,' 163 [57 Cal.Rptr. 163, 424 P.2d 715], the
court, faced with a nonprejudicial confession under the rule
of People v. Cotter, 63 Cal.2d 386, 398 [46 Cal.Rptr. 622, 405
P.2d 862], refused to rest" affirmance of the judgment solely
upon our evaluation of the minor effect of the defendant's
confession upon the jury;" we must still weigh its impact upon
defendant's trial." In following Fahy v. Connecticut, 375
U.S. 85 [11 L.Ed.2d 171, 84 S.Ct. 229], and Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, we were concerned with procedural
fairness, with the integrity of the judicial process, as well as
with the outcome of the case. It bears emphasis that we cannot
adhere to rules that we would adopt were the final responsibilityours (see People v. Modesto, 62 Ca1.2d 436, 447-454 [42
Cal.Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753] ; People v. Watson, 46 Ca1.2d
818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]), but must faithfully adhere to the
United States Constitution as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court.
<:~
By focusing solely on the outcome of the case, the majority
opinion misconceives the purpose of the harmless error rule as
it has developed in the federal courts. Chapman stands at tIle
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end of a long line of Supreme Court cases determining the
standards for harmless error in criminal cases,4 in which the
court benefited from a remarkable dialogue in the Second CircuitG whose principal participants were Learned Hand and
Jerome Frank. Since the earlier federal standards were less
favorable to defendants than the Fahy-Chapman standard,
except for those errors deemed automatically prejudicial,
error that would have been reversible under the earlier cases
is a fortiori reversible now. Under those cases the majority
opinion in the present case errs by independently determining
guilt or innocence (Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 611
[89 L.Ed. 495,499, 65 8.0t. 548, 156 A.L.R. 496]), impliedly
speculating on the possibility of reconviction (Kotteako8 v.
United States, supra, 328 U.S. 750, 763 [90 L.Ed. 1557, 15651566]), and considering the evidence without the error and
thereby minimizing the influence of the error on the verdict
(Bihn v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 633, 637 [90 L.Ed.
1485, 1488] ; Fahy v. Oonnecticut, supra, 375 U.S. 85, 88-92
[11 L.Ed.2d 171, 174-176]).
Review of the development of the harmless error rule
demonstrates that it, cannot be lightly invoked to cure constitutional error. Roscbe Pound, an early advocate of harmless
error reform in the United States, attacked the "Exchequer
rule"6 that required reversal for all errors and stated that
4See, e.g., Horning v. District of Oolumbia, 254 U.S. 135 [65 L.Ed.
185,41 S.Ot. 53]; Sinclair v. United State8, 279 U.S. 749 [73 L.Ed. 938,
49 S.Ot. 471, 63 A.L.R. 1258]; Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308,
315 [75 L.Ed. 1054, 1058, 51 S.Ot. 470, 73 A.L.R. 1203]; [dissenting
opinion]; Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 [79 L.Ed. 1314, 55 S.Ot.
629]; Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 [84 L.Ed. 257,60 S.Ot. 198];
United States v. Sooony-VaclIlum Oil 00., 310 U.S. 150 [84 L.Ed. 1129,
60 S.Ot. 811]; Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606 [89 L.Ed. 495, 65
S.Ot. 548, 156 A.L.R. 496]; Bollenbaoh v. United States, 326 U.S. 607
[90 L.Ed. 350, 66 S.Ot. 402]; Bihn v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 633;
Kottea1co8 v. United State8, 328 U.S. 750 [90 L.Ed. 1557, 66 S.Ot. 1239];
Piswio1c v. United State8, 329 U.S. 211 [91 L.Ed. 196, 67 S.Ot. 224];
Krulewitoh v. United State8, 336 U.S. 440 [93 L.Ed. 790, 69 S.Ot. 716].
6United States v. Berger, 73 F.2d 278, revd. 295 U.S. 78 [79 L.Ed. 1314~
55 S.Ot. 629]; United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921, revd. 308 U.S. 287
[84 L.Ed. 257, 60 S.Ot. 198]; United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995; United
States v. Mitohell, 137 F.2d 1006; United States v. Bollenbaoh, 147 F.2d
199, revd. 326 U.S. 607 [90 L.Ed. 350, 66 S.Ot. 402]; United States v.
Le1caoo8, 151 F.2d 170, revd. 328 U.S. 750 [90 L.Ed. 1557,66 S.Ot. 1239];
Uf&ited State8 v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915; United State8 v.Bennett,
152 F.2d 342, revd. sub. nom., Bihn v. United States, 328 U.S. 633 [90
L.Ed. 1485, 66 S.Ot. 1172]; Uftited States v. Antonelli Fireworks 00., 155
F.2d 631; United States v. Krulewitch, 167 F.2d 943, revd. 336 U.S. 440
[93 L.Ed. 790, 69 S.Ct. 716].
80rease v. Barrett, 1 C.M. & R. 933, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (Ex. 1835).
See generally 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 21 (3d ed. 1940). A harmless error
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"the worst feature (If American procedure is the lavish granting of new trials." (Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (1906) 29 A.B.A.
Rep. 395, 413; see also (1908) 33 A.B.A.Rep. 542, 545, fn. 1
[bibliography of other contemporary criticism].) In 1907 the
American Bar Association established a Special Committee to
Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws to Prevent
Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation. «1907) 31 A.B.A.
Rep. 505.) The Special Committee recommended the enactment of a statute «1908) 33 A.B.A.Rep. 542, 550) that was
introduced in Congress in 1908 and reintroduced in 1909 in a
slightly modified form (S. 4568, H.R. 14,552). A supporting
brief stated that the purpose of the bill was to stop "reversals
for technical defects in the procedure below." «1910) 35
A.B.A.Rep. 624.) Contemporaneously with the hearings on
the A.B.A. "technical error" bill in Congress, Senator A. E.
Boynton of the California Legislature proposed an amendment to the California Constitution substantially the same as
the A.B.A. bill. T The Legislature adopted the proposed
amendment, and it was placed on the ballot. The official argument to the voters describes the reasons for the reform movement in the United States and presents examples of technical
errors complained of by the reformers. 8 The California constirule had been prevalent befo~e that time "as there could not be a new
trial in felony, such a conviction ought not to be set aside [fn. omitted].
because some other evidence had been given which ought not to have been
received." (Rea: v. Ball, Russ & Ry. (1807) 132,133,168 Eng. Rep. 721.)
The rule requiring per se reversals became the prevailing rule in this
country. (Wigmore, Evidence, supra, § 21.)
1"No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted in any criminal
case on the ground of misdirection of the jury or the improper admission
or rejection of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or
procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire eause including the
evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of
has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." (2 Cal. Stats. 1911, Res. Ch.
36, p. 1798 (Sen. Const. Amend. No. 26).) The language in the A.B.A.
bill and the California constitutional amendment was suggested by Order
29, rule 6, of the Rules of the English Supreme Court of Judicature. (See
(1910) 3;j A.B.A. Rep. 614, 615.)
.
8Statement of Senator A. E. Boynton: " . . . The absurd lengths to
which courts have gone in the reversal of cases for immaterial errors is
shown by a recital of a few examples: In Missouri a case was reversed
and the prisoner escaped conviction because the indictment alleged the
deceased 'instantly died' instead of charging according to t~ ancient
formula that he 'did then and there die.' In a Texas case the elimination
of the letter' r' from the word' first' sa.ved a murderer from the gallows,
when his guilt was absolutely determined. In our own state a conviction
for murder was set aside because the indictment failed to state that the
man killed was a human being. . . .
The Missouri ease was a commonly used example durin~ the reform
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tutional amendment was adopted on October 10, 1911, and the
federal harmless error rule was adopted by Congress in 1919. 9
Based on this history the Supreme Court stated that the
federal harmless error statute was intended" to prevent matters concerned with the' mere etiquette of trials and with the
formalities and minutiae of procedure from touching the
merits of a verdict." (Bruno v. United States, supra, 308
U.S. 287, 293-294 [84 L.Ed. 257, 260-261].) "The 'technical
errors' against which Congress protected jury verdicts are of
the kind which led some judges to trivialize law by giving all
legal prescriptions equal potency. See Taft, Administration of
Criminal LClIW (1905) 15 Yale L.J. 1, 15. Deviations from
formal correctness do not touch the substance of the standards
by which guilt is determined in our courts, and it is these that
Congress rendered harmless. . . . " (Bollenbach v. United
States, 326 U.S. 607, 615 [90 L.Ed. 350, 355, 66 S.Ct. 402].)
The Supreme Court has construed the federal.rule to place
the burden on the prosecution to show that "substantial
rights" were not affected by the error. (Kotteakos v. United
States, supra, 328 U.S. 750, 760 [90 L.Ed. 1557, 1564].) In
California, on the other hand, the court has consistently
placed the burden on the appellant attacking the verdict.
(People v. Watson, supra., 46 Ca1.2d 818, 836-838.) Since the
period and is cited and discussed in Kotteakos v. United States, supra,
328 U.S. 750, 760, fn. 14 [90 L.Ed. 1557, 1564].
Statement of State Senator E. S. Birdsall:". . . The supreme court
has held in 21 Cal. 344 that it is a fatal omission to fail to state in an indictment for robbery that the property taken is not the property of the
person charged, although the very word 'robbery' itself conclusively
implies this. In 56 Cal. 406 a conviction was set aside because the letter
'n' was accidentally omitted from the word 'larceny,' though it is probable that no person in the wide world could have had any doubt as to
the word intended. • . . In 62 Cal. 309 a conviction of murder was reversed because the trial court permitted a surgeon who had examined the
wounds to testify as to the probable position of the deceased when the
fatal shot was fired. This was in line with the doctrine announced in
47 Cal. 114 that' every error in the admission of testimony is presumed
to be injurious unless the contrary clearly appears.' Trial judges of long
experience declare that it is wholly beyond human skill for the most able
and conscientious judge, in the course of a long and busy trial extending
over days or weeks to avoid trifling inaccuracies now and then in the
thousand and one rulings that they are compelled to make on the spur of
the moment. . . ."
928 United States Code section 2111 now provides: "On the hearing
of an appeal or writ of certiorari in any ease, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or
defects which do not affect the substantial rights pf the parties. " Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 52, subdivision (a), provides: "Any
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded."
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original focus of harmless error reform was on technical error,
it has always been recognized that some errors were reversible
regardless of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. (See
Gideon v. lVainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805,
83 S.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733] ; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
523 [71 L.Ed. 749, 754,47 8.Ct. 437, 50 A.L.R. 1243] ; People
v. OO'fl.ley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310, 319-320; People v. McKay,
supra, 37 Ca1.2d 792, 798-800; People v. 8arazzawski, supra,
27 Ca1.2d 7, 10-11; People v. Patubo, supra, 9 Cal.2d 537,542543; People v. Mahooell, supra, 201 Cal. 618, 627; People v.
Muza, supra, 178 CaI.App.2d 901, 913-914, cert.den. 369 U.S.
839; People v. DUl1ernay, supra, 43 CaI.App.2d 823, 828-831.)
The Ohapman case establishes, however, that Griffin error is
not necessarily prejudicial.
To affirm the judgment under the rule set forth in the
Chapman case the court must C Cbe able to declare a belief that·
[the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." (386
U.S: at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 711].) We must be able to say
that the Attorney General "has demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecutor's comments and the trial
judge's instruction did not contribute to" defendant ts conviction. (386 U.S. at p. 26 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 711],) This
language is susceptible of two interpretations, and the Ohapman opinion lends support to both. !
It may mean only that the court must believe beyond a
reasonable ·doubt that the result would have been the same in
the absence of the error. Under this view, if the court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that no reasonable jury·
could have found the defendant innocent on the same record
minus the error, it should affirm. This approach is the one this
court has adopted in interpreting the California harmless
error rule (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), although our standatii
for affirmance is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt that tie
result would have been the same, but the absence of a showing
that it is reasonably probable that the result would have been
different in the absence of the error. (People v. Watson,
supra, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 836.) Watson makes clear, of course,
that "reasonably probable" does not mean more probable
than not. It means only that there appear some substantial
chance greater than a mere possibility that the result would
have been different in the absence of the error. Thus the court
was careful to point out that a reversal is required if it
cannot be determined whether or not the error affected the
result, for in such case there "exists . . . at least such an

)

July 1967]

PEOPLE 'V. Ross
[6'1 C.2d 64; 60 Cal.Rptr. 254, 429 P.2d 606]

85

equal balance of reasonable probabilities" that" the court is
of the opinion 'that it is reasonably probable that a result
more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the absence of the error.' " (46 Cal.2d at p. 837.)
There is language in Ohapman that indicates that the court
was.concerned with the possibility that the result would have
been different in the absence of the error. It seems more likely,
however, that the court deemed a showing beyond a reasonable
doubt that the result would not have been different as only
the first step in establishing that a constitutional error was
not prejudicial. Thus it contrasted "small errors or defects
that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result
of the trial" with errors that " 'affect substantial rights' "
of a party, and it pointed out that" An error in admitting
plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury
adversely to a litigant cannot, under Fahy, be conceived of as
harmless." (Ohapman v. Oalifornia, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24
[17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710, 87 8.Ct. 824, 827-828].) Moreover, it
expressly rejected this court's reliance on overwhelming evidence to establish harmless error, a rejection that can be
explained only on :the theory that a substantial error that
might have contrihnted to the result cannot be deemed harmless regardless of how clearly it appears that the jury would
havc reached the same result by an error-free route had the
erroneous route been denied it. Overwhelming evidence of
guilt does not negate the fact that an error that constituted a
substantial part of the prosecution's case may have played a
substantial part in the jury's deliberation and thus COlltributed to the actual verdict reached, for the jury may have
reached its verdict because of the error without considering
other reasons untainted by error that would have supported
the same result. (Robinson v. California, supra, 370 U.S. 660,
665 [8 L.Ed.2d 758, 762] ; Williams v. North Oarolina, supra,
317 U.S. 287, 292 [87 L.Ed. 279, 282]; Stromberg v. CaJifornia, supra, 283 U.S. 359, 368 [75 L.Ed. 1117,1122].)
The view that Ohapman requires the state to show not only
that the result would have been tIle same absent the error, but
also that the error could not have played any substantial part
in the jury's reaching its verdict, finds support in earlier
Supreme Court decisions. In determining whether an error is
substantial, i.e., whether it affected a substantial right of the
defendant, the court has focused on the part the error may
have played at the trial. Once it appears that it was a sub-
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stantial part of the prosecution's case, reversal is required.
Neither the court's own view of the defendant's guilt nor its
conviction that the jury would have reached the same result
in the absence of the error can then save the judgment. (Bihn
v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 633, 637 [90 L.Ed. 1484,
1488] ; Kotteako.s v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 750, 763
[90 L.Ed. 1557, 1565-1566] ; Bo.llenbfreh v. United States, 326
U.S. 607, 613-614 [90 L.Ed. 350, 354-355, 66 S.Ct. 402] ; Weiler v. United States, supra, 323 U.S. 606, 611 [89 L.Ed. 495,
499] ; Bruno. v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 [84 L.Ed.
257, 260-261, 60 S.Ct. 198].)
In the present case, as in Ohapman, the comments and
instruction on defendant's silence constituted a substantial
part of the prosecution's case. It served to make defendant a
witness against himself by using his silence to stifle the doubts
that might have been engendered by the inconsistencies in the
prosecution's case. (Griffin v. Oalifo.rnia, 380 U.S. 609 [14
L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229].) It denied defendant a substantial right, for it served to deprive him of his only defense.
Under these circumstances the Attorney General has not
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would
have been the same in the absence of error. A fo.rtiori, he has
not established beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous
comment and instruction did not in fact contribute to the
result.
Peters, J., concurred.

